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A Brief Inquiry into the 
Imperatives of the Coastal 
Zone and the Processes of 
Institutional Change .... 
Robert I. Reis 
The ebb and flow of the tide marks only the surface of biological and legal 
flux in the coastal zone. The physical and biological revelations of the 1960's 
and 1970's, and the attempted responses of the legal system to the imperatives 
thereby postulated, have given rise to a set of legal, ethical, and processual 
questions even more difficult to conceptualize than their physical counterparts 
-the realities of the coastal zone that prompted them. 
Coastal area decisionmaking involves a set of institutional norms that 
have long informed perceptions of coastal area processes, but that no longer 
respond to or serve contemporary needs. This is not surprising, since the 
"wastelands" of the 1950's and early 1960's have become the priceless ecologi-
cal gems' of the 1970's-"wetlands," "mudflats," "swamps," and "bogs" 
have become synonymous with values of a status almost beyond questioning. 
Belated recognition of the enormous ecological value of these areas has led to 
frenetic, crisis-born attempts to stave off their destruction.2 During the late 
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1. This concept of wetlands as wastelands was reflected in two separate but equally interesting
situations. The first was in testimony before the National Commission on Urban Problems by 
Ozmore, in his Plea For Wetlands Protection: 
At one time not too many years ago, the marshlands of our country were referred to 
as "wastelands." Nothing could be further from the truth. Our wetlands literally
teem with life, from the lowest form of amoebic animals to the fur-bearing mammals 
which have meant millions of dollars to our population. They are the nursery
grounds for most of our protein supply from the sea. 
3 HEARINGS BEFORE THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS 204 
at 205 (July-August 1967). Cf. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
wherein the Corps was ordered by the court to re-evaluate the Wallisville and Trinity River 
projects and prepare a new Environmental Impact Statement concerning the project. The 
prior report could be characterized as evidencing a bias toward minimizing the value of and 
impact on the affected wetlands and fisheries. The decision is a delightful disclosure of the 
machinations of inner decisionmaking and traditional weightings inherent in Corps cost 
benefit studies. 
2. A limited insight into the depth of feeling evoked by wetlands preservation can be gleaned 
from the following quotation: 
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1960's and early 1970's, statutes were enacted by the legislative bodies of sev-
eral states, and the flow of case law increased to a cascade exceeding all expec-
tation.3 Congress enacted a steady progression of laws: the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act," the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act,5 the National 
Estuarine Act,6 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act7 and Amend-
ments." 
The new mythology of coastal area values was so firmly rooted in emerg-
ing public policy that the pronouncements of state and federal legislation read 
like codifications of the postulates of biological imperative and impending ir-
retrievable resource loss. Wetlands preservation and coastal zone management 
are premised on real and demonstrable ecological values,9 and the process of 
legitimating these values through legislation was undertaken in the haste that 
such critical values require. If the postulates were justified, no time should be 
lost in implementing measures designed to preserve wetlands and protect them 
from further despoliation, needless destruction, and loss. 
The earth, its habitats, and its inhabitants are all of one piece. But if a person were 
forced to select the most important natural habitat on earth, the answer would have 
to be the estuary-where most of the land is under water, where the river is no longer 
river, the ocean not yet ocean, but where life thrives as nowhere else. 
It is often said rather vaguely that life began in the sea .... It is much more likely 
that the birthplace of life was an estuary, a highly enriched environment where the 
wastes of the continents, silts, clays, dissolved solids and gases could be combined in 
the presence of gently ebbing and flowing tides that kept nutrients supplied and 
wastes diluted. 
Hearings on H.R. 25 Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the 
House Comm. on MerchantMarineandFisheries,90th Cong., 1st Sess., 442, 443 (1967). See 
also Heath, EstuarineConservationLegislationin the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REV. 
351, at 351, 352 (1970). The Supreme Court of Connecticut in Brecciaroli v. Commissioner 
of Environmental Protection, 36 CONN. L.J. 5 (1974), noted "both... the importance 
of wetlands as natural resources and... their imminent demise at the hands of man." 
Id. at 6. The Rhode Island Supreme Court was somewhat called upon in Mills, Inc. v. 
Murphy, 352 A.2d 661 (1976), to distinguish between Freshwater and Tidal Wetlands Acts 
and procedures. In doing so, the court noted the different pressures and policies attendant on 
different forms of environmental regulation as follows: 
The Coastal Wetlands Act envisions affirmative action on the part of the Depart-
ment of Natural Resources to the end of establishing a statewide plan for the protec-
tion of wetlands. The instant Act, on the other hand, sets out a permit procedure 
whereby the landowner is required to initiate the proceedings. This difference in 
overall approach is susceptible to a variety of reasonable explanations: the greater 
development pressure on coastal wetlands suggests the need for immediate state ac-
tion while the situation regarding fresh water wetlands might not be so pressing; the 
high incidence of state-ownership in coastal wetlands might facilitate centralized 
action while the almost exclusively private ownership of fresh water wetlands would 
tend to hinder such an approach; the probable interdependence and interactions of 
coastal wetlands could necessitate unitary state action while the more random pat-
tern of fresh water wetlands might thwart such an attempt. 
Having in mind the need for significantly different approaches to the regulation 
of fresh and salt water wetlands, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that the 
two methods of regulation posed dangers of differing magnitude to the rights of pri-
vate individuals. Thus they may have decided that a statewide program of affirma-
tive action, being less sensitive to individual circumstances, required the inclusion of 
prior hearings and a provision for compensation, while a procedure that envisioned 
the processing of a series of individual applications required only the availability of 
judicial review to ensure the protection of all constitutional rights, including that of 
just compensation. In these circumstances, we cannot say that the classifications 
created by the Legislature lack all rational basis. 
Id. at 668-69. 
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3. See generally Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1973); Zabel v. Tabb, 
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); State v. Johnson, 365 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970); MacGibbon. v. 
Board of Appeals, 356 Mass. 635, 255 N.E.2d 347 (1970); Commissioner of Natural Re-
sources v. S. Volpe, Inc., 349 Mass. 204, 206 N.E.2d 666 (1965). 
4. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (1974). See also U.S. Dep't of 
the Interior, National Estuarine Pollution Study, S. DOC. No. 58, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 
(1970). 
5. Land and Water Conservation Fund Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4 to 4601-11 (1974). For an anal-
ysis of expenditures under the Act see National Outdoor Recreation Programs and Policies, 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation of the Comm. on Inter-
ior and Insular Affairs, H. R.,93d Cong., Ist Sess., at 383-400 (1973). 
6. National Estuarine Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1223-26 (1974). 
§ 1221. Congressional declaration of policy.
Congress finds and declares that many estuaries in the United States are rich in a 
variety of natural, commercial, and other resources, including environmental 
natural beauty, and are of immediate and potential value to the present and future 
generations of Americans. It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to provide a 
means for considering the need to protect, conserve, and restore these estuaries in a 
manner that adequately and reasonably maintains a balance between the national 
need for such protection in the interest of conserving the natural resources and 
natural beauty of the Nation and the need to develop these estuaries to further the 
growth and development of the Nation. In connection with the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the estuaries of the Nation and in consequence of the benefits resulting to 
the public, it is declared to be the policy of Congress to recognize, preserve, and pro-
tect the responsibilities of the States in protecting, conserving and restoring the estu-
aries in the United States. 
7. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1151-75 (1970). 
8. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1975). 
9. However real and demonstrable ecological values have been, absorbing them into a workable 
legal context has been a traditional problem. At least a partial solution may be seen in the 
work of Odum & Skjei, The Issue of Wetlands Preservation and Management: A Second 
View, I COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT J. 150 (1974), wherein the authors attempt to 
quantify some of the ecological values of wetlands. Some form of quantification of ecological
values is necessary for the balancing of conflicting interests in any decisionmaking context. 
This is particularly appropriate for agency or judicial decisionmaking affecting wetlands 
development. Thus, one could sdy that the development of a legal context involves the integra-
tion of ecological and economic analysis. A significant problem arises at this point, in that the 
traditional legal/economic context has involved the impact of agency restrictions on the use 
value of property to private individuals. To justify the integration of economic/environmental 
values, one must be concerned with public sector values. 
It is only recently that a balancing of public sector outcomes has been proposed as an inte-
gral part of the administrative or judicial process which determines the validity of police 
power regulations. The court in Rykar v. Gill, the first and withdrawn opinion of which ap-
appears at 6 E.R.C. 1333 (Conn. Super. 1973), acknowledged this recent standard when it 
remanded the case to the Commissioner of Environmental Protection as follows on July 18, 
1975: 
The plaintiff's application and alternative proposals are to be considered in light of 
the rule that in the regulation of private property the welfare of the public, rather 
than private [sic] gain is of paramount consideration provided that the regulation 
does not so restrict the use of private property for any reasonable purpose as to result 
in a "practical confiscation." 
Unreported remand (emphasis added). The italicized language is an adaption of the language 
of the court in Brecciaroli v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 36 CONN. L.J. 5 
(1974). Therein, the Supreme Court of Connecticut worked a progression of reasoning from 
the Connecticut General Statutes §§ 22a-33, which sets forth the general public policy of
"public health and welfare" considerations, through the aforenoted language in the remand 
order, culminating in the court's upholding the denial of the landowner's application for a 
permit to develop because "it merely prohibited one specific use which presumptively was not 
reasonable when balanced against the public harm it would create. "Id. at 8 (emphasis added). 
The implications of both the quantification and balancing process are great strides forward 
in the realization of these goals or objectives which are "premised on real and demonstrable 
ecological values." 
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However, the quantum shift from zero value to enormous value occurred 
so suddenly and unexpectedly that the normal process of judicial and legisla-
tive maturation in response to changes in contemporary values and beliefs 
could not occur. The small, deliberate, incremental changes in traditional defi-
nitions and conceptions of private property, the expansion of the bounds of 
police-power regulation, and the emergence of mechanisms for the acquisition 
of coastal area lands and the vesting of control over them in the public sector 
never occurred in the orderly fashion that characterizes most legal change.' 0 
10. To some extent the tone of legal analysis reflects some of this difference in the process of judi-
cial and legislative change of basic values. A position is often assumed in regard to the subject 
of analysis which does not necessarily reflect the underlying nature of the change that is advo-
cated. See generally F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLIES & J.BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF LAND USE CONTROL (1973); 
Jaffee, The Public Trust Doctrineis Alive and Kicking in New Jersey Tidalwaters:Neptune 
City v. Avon-by-the-Sea-A Case of Happy Atavism?, 14 NAT. RES. J. 309 (1974). The 
most interesting analysis is found in 1 & 2 V. YANNANCONE & B. COHEN, ENVIRON-
MENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDIES (1971), wherein the authors advocate that these 
concepts must be argued in every court of the land. They note in the midst of their publik trust 
discussion: 
The Trust Doctrine must be urged in as many courts in the land as will listen. Suits 
must be brought each time a smoke stack spewing forth sulphur dioxide threatens to 
degrade the quality of the air that belongs to all of us; each time the waste from a 
paper mill pollutes the water we drink; each time a pesticide or herbicide contami-
nates the air, water or vegetation we own in common; each time a "fastbuck" devel-
oper landfills a wetland or estuary to the detriment of the important balance of our 
food chain; and each time a governmental authority callously decides to build a road 
or other public project in such manner as to threaten the integrity of the ecosystem 
involved. 
I id.at 17. 
On the question of the future of private property, the authors are equally purposeful in their 
advocacy:
There need be no hesitation on the part of the environmental advocate to seek to 
curtail the private use of any property which is cloaked with the public interest. The 
landowner's right to just compensation for property given by the due process provi-
sions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution must be balanced against the right 
of the people to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of national and natural resource 
treasures as trusts for the People, not only of this generation, but of those genera-
tions yet unborn. 
And, 
[tihere is ample precedent for the taking of private property in the absence of 
eminent domain proceedings and without just compensation. The regulation and 
control of the uses to which property may be put often constitutes a taking where the 
effect of such regulation is so complete as to deprive the owner of all or most of his 
interest in the property. 
Id. at 43. 
As distinguished from the result-oriented analysis of the above works, note the objectivity 
of Michelman, Property,Utility,andFairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundation of "Just 
Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 
74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964); Sax, Takings, PrivatePropertyand PublicRights, 81 YALE L. J. 
149 (1971). 
For a traditional example of progressional change, see generally Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1927). 
Several excellent articles are contained in a Symposium Issue of the North Carolina Law 
Review. Particularly notable are: Maloney and Ausness, The Use and Legal Significanceof 
the Mean High Water Line in Coastal Boundary Mapping, 53 N.C.L. REV. 185 (1974); 
Schoenbaum, The Management of Land and Water Use in the CoastalZone: A New Law is 
Enacted in North Carolina, 53 N.C.L. REV. 275 (1974); Glenn, The CoastalArea Manage-
ment Act in the Courts:A PreliminaryAnalysis, 53 N.C.L. REV. 303 (1974). 
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During this transition time, a set of seemingly irreconcilable opposites 
occupied the public eye. Coastal area issues proliferated in number and were 
increasingly cast in the extremes of discontent. Processes of deliberation, com-
promise, and reasoned decisionmaking had not yet caught up with these issues, 
and discussion was phrased in terms of stark contrasts: "preservation" or 
"development," "regulation" or "confiscation." Conservationists and 
developers alike perceived the issues thus framed as both explosive and implo-
sive and each group devoured its own kind as well as the opposition in the 
attempt to legitimize and ensure the realization of its particular goals and 
strongly held beliefs. 'I 
A quandary so fundamental that it affects basic social and environmental 
values presents few solutions from within. Time is the obvious neutral factor 
in the reconciliation of these conflicts. Only time can transmute extremes into 
reasoned legal doctrine. Equally important, time is necessary for an external 
analysis of possible alternative systems of control and allocation of coastal 
area resources. Such analysis is absolutely necessary, but to be valid it must, so 
far as possible, assume neither the givens nor the goals of the present contro-
versy. An external analysis must approach, ab initio, all questions affecting 
the structuring and allocating of coastal area resources.12 
A series of interrelated questions can be used to illustrate the extent to 
which external considerations should be imposed on such an inquiry. Should 
any form of private property exist in the coastal area? 3 If so, what are the 
desirable sets of expectations based on property rights that could conceivably 
be created in the private sector, and how do these compare with property rights 
now in existence? 1' Particular emphasis must be given here to the recognition 
of all relevant values in the allocative process and the dislocation (if any) which 
would occur in the event of a transition from one set of property expectations 
11. A recent victim of the process of being devoured both by his own kind and by others is exem-
plified by the Commissioner of Environmental Conservation in New York, who resigned in 
1976. Courier Express (Buffalo), May 1976, at 13, 16. 
12. The need to so structure these issues and set them forth for the reader's consideration consti-
tutes one of the original reasons for the first Sea Grant Law Journal. See generally Tecaff, 
The Coastal Zone-Control Over Encroachments into the Tidewaters, 1 J. MARIT. L. & 
COM. 241 (1970). See particularly the summary and conclusion appearing at 284-290. An 
early attempt at management analysis can be found in Knight, Proposed Systems of Coastal 
Zone Management: An Interim Analysis, 3 NAT. RES. LAW. 599 (1970). 
13. Although the issues are not phrased in this manner, a broader reading of F. BOSSELMAN, 
D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, supra note 10, and Jaffe, supra note 10, could lead to a recon-
struction of their underlying issues as the asking of this question. 
14. The decision of the court in Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wisc.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1973), 
could be compared with any of the other three cases cited in note 3 supra-Johnson, 
MacGibbon or S. Volpe-as decisions affecting the allocation of wetlands resources which 
serve to illustrate the dichotomy between positions which exist on the issues of propertied 
expectations. A more direct comparison might be, however, that of Just with the philos-
ophy expressed in Baker v. Normanock Ass'n, 25 N.J. 407, 136 A.2d 645 (1957), which 
anticipates private ownership. The icing on this cake could be supplied by a reading of 
RACHLIS & MARQUSEE, THE LAND LORDS (1963). Baker and THE LAND LORDS 
assume the values of fostering private ownership of land and resources in American society. 
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to another. What public and private institutions is it possible to create to exer-
cise concurrent control over the allocation and use of these resources? Finally, 
what formal basis of governmental justification should evolve as warrant for 
its activities in the total coastal area, and what political, legal, and social issues 
lie concealed within any fundamental change in governmental theory? Further 
questions could be addressed to the more traditional issues of standing, home 
rule, state versus federal rights, and to the myriad related constitutional issues. 
These questions, however, are not sufficiently free of the set of existing 
normative biases to produce the creative thinking necessary to deal with the 
fundamental changes wrought by the last decade. 
The past decade may be characterized as one of extraordinary govern-
mental frustration in the reallocation of both the power and the duties atten-
dant upon control of the process of coastal zone management. It may be hypo-
thesized that no one anticipated the concurrent pull of the government's 
simultaneous attempt to avoid the political, economic, and environmental 
pressures attendant upon such control. State and federal agencies may also 
have been frustrated by internal problems of personnel limitations and pro-
gram management, particularly where the thrust of an agency's involvement in 
the past had been the antithesis of the duties with which it was charged under 
new legislative and judicial directives. Regulatory jurisdiction also brought 
with it the concomitant liability of having such regulations found by the courts 
to be in excess of the constitutional limitations on the police power, and de-
clared to be "takings." 
The distinction between proper exercises of the police power and regula-
tory excesses ("takings") was an uncertain one inasmuch as there was a simul-
taneous search (1) for some appropriate level of government to exercise juris-
diction and control over the allocation of coastal resources, and (2) for a 
normative answer to the question of the degree of "privateness" desirable in 
the coastal area. This uncertainty reflects the rapid transmutation of social 
values that has occurred in the last decade. 
A series of underlying questions involved in any attempt to deal with 
issues like those just noted must be based on working doctrinal materials to 
ensure that what is studied has some relation to reality. The received materials 
with which one must begin bear little relation to contemporary problem solv-
ing. The first task, then, is not only to collect existing doctrinal materials, but 
to begin an analysis of them in the framework of contemporary methods for 
problem-identification and decisionmaking. 
One method of problem-identification is the collection of questions 
around which there is evidenced the greatest concern. The problems thus iden-
tified can form the basis of a unified inquiry into problems of the coastal zone. 
The inquiry might well be organized as follows: (1) sources and extent of pri-
vate and public interests in the coastal zone; (2) governmental arrangements 
for the recognition and allocation of coastal zone resources; (3) processual 
Imperatives of the Coastal Zone 
questions involving mechanisms for achieving coastal zone values; and, (4) 
access to governmental and institutional decisionmaking in the coastal zone. 
This first issue of the Sea Grant Law Journal is intended both to report on 
the existing state of legal relations involving those issues considered, and to 
provoke future studies into coastal zone processes and resources. 
